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AGORA: FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE IRAQ CONFLICT
EDITORS' INTRODUCTION
The military action against Iraq in spring 2003 is one of the few events of the UN Charter
period holding the potential for fundamental transformation, or possibly even destruction,
of the system of law governing the use of force that had evolved during the twentieth century.
As with the great debates surrounding U.S. involvement in the two world wars, the establish-
ment of the United Nations, and the challenges to UN Charter norms during the Cold War,
thisJournalseeks to provide a forum for reasoned and respectful treatment of legal issues that
have aroused fierce passions.
The decision of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State to participate with colleagues
in this forum reinvigorates an important tradition of explaining and exchanging views on
the legal position of the United States in international controversies. U.S. lawyers took pains
to articulate a legal theory in support of the quarantine of Cuba, in a memorandum made
public October 23, 1962, which the Department of State's chief legal officer of the day later
characterized as a "best-seller."' Government legal opinions about the Vietnam War were
published and subjected to critical scrutiny, in thisJournal and in studies sponsored by the
American Society of International Law.2 An official U.S. view of legality of military interven-
tion in Central America was set out at length in connection with resisting Nicaragua's suit at
the International Court ofJustice. 3 Concerning the 1999 Kosovo intervention (which shares
with the recent Iraq action the circumstance that the Security Council had not explicitly au-
thorized use of military force), parliamentary debates in several of the intervening countries
and litigation brought by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the ICJ elicited a fairly full
exposition of legalIjustifications on the public record; from such materials it was possible to
discern an overall legal position of the NATO coalition (with nuances among the various
coalition partners) and to infer the main lines of a U.S. legal position. In respect of the 2003
Iraq conflict, the views of the British government on international legal aspects were conveyed
to parliament through a formal opinion of the Attorney-General;4 in the absence of a com-
parable and equally accessible legal opinion from the U.S. government, the actual U.S. posi-
tion on justification for military action in 2003 could easily have been misunderstood.
Short of a full-scale legal analysis, the U.S. government did intimate the general contours of
its position on legitimate use of force against Iraq, over the period spanning President George
W. Bush's address to the UN General Assembly on September 12, 2002, and the outbreak of
war in late March 2003. But in the same time frame the Bush administration also announced
'ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE ROLE OF LAW 48 (1974).
2 See, e.g., THEVENAM WARAND INTERNATIONALLAW (Richard A. Falk ed., 4vols., 1968,1969,1972,1976); Symposium:
The United States Militay Action in Cambodia, 1970, in the Light of International and Constitutional Law, 65 AJIL 1 (1971).
'Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 ICJ REP. 392 (Nov. 26); 1986
ICJ REP. 14 (June'27). Cf Agora: U.S. Forces in Panama: Defenders, Aggressors or Human Rights Activists ?, 84 AJIL 494
(1990); Abraham 1). Sofaer, The Legality of the United States Actions in Panama, 29 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'LL. 281 (1991)
(article by Legal Adviser).
4 Lord Goldsmith, Attorney General Clarifies Legal Basis for Use of Force AgainstIraq (Mar. 18, 2003), available
at <http://www.fc.gov.uk>.
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a new strategic doctrine of preemptive use of force in respect of weapons of mass destruc-
tion and terrorism.5 The confluence of these'developments led many observers to conclude
that the initiation of armed force against Iraq in March 2003 was the first application of the
new preemption doctrine. Analytically, however, there are alternative and narrower bases
on which a legal argument supporting the Iraq war could rest, deriving from the unfinished
business of the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and Iraq's flouting of numerous compulsory reso-
lutions of the UN Security Council concerning demilitarization and disarmament between
1991 and 2003. The implications of the war for the future of the international system may
depend in some measure on whether the issue of its legality is limited to interpretation of
Security Council resolutions applicable only to Iraq, or broadened to embrace the very mean-
ing, utility, and vitality of the Charter's basic provisions on the use of force and self-defense.
This Journal has devoted substantial attention to legal aspects of the Iraq conflict, beginning
with the issuesjust after the 1990 attack6 and continuing through the lead article in the present
issue.7 We have published a variety of articles, comments, and other pieces presenting diverse
viewpoints on legitimacy of uses of force against Iraq with or without authorization of the UN
Security Council, as well as on anticipatory self-defense and preemptive uses of force.8 Addi-
tionally, our section on Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law treats
the latest developments in U.S. practice toward Iraq in every quarterly issue.9
Against this background, the Editors in Chief announced at the annual meeting of the
American Society of International Law in April 2003 that we would convene an Agora on
Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict for the present issue. We received an outpouring of
submissions, only a handful of which can be published within the applicable space constraints.
Indeed, to allow for consideration of developments that were in progress as this issue was
in production, and in that connection to broaden participation beyond U.S. contributors, we
plan to continue the Agora in the October 2003 issue of thejotirnal. Our terms of reference
were (and remain) forward-looking, in that we have encouraged contributors to envision what
the future international law of the use of force will be and should become in the aftermath
of the Iraq crisis. While respecting those terms of reference, several of our contributors have
chosen as a starting point a brief analysis of the lawfulness of the initiation of military force
by the United States and its coalition partners in spring 2003. These highly compressed treat-
ments can only hint at the complexities of legal issues that will continue to be debated in these
pages and elsewhere.'"
The U.S. decision to invade Iraq has evoked strong political reactions evident in many of
the manuscripts submitted. While we are grateful to the contributors for their response to our
request to avoid acrimony, we also eschewed the role of censor in this debate and felt that
readers would benefit from knowing, and being able to assess independently, those percep-
tions and perspectives that an author maintains are pertinent to the legal analysis. Readers
will find below a range of viewpoints illustrative of the spectrum of opinion within the U.S.
legal community.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Sept. 17, 2002), available at <http://
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>.
6 Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign Relations Law, 85 AJIL 63-109, 506-35 (1991).
Michael Lewis, The Law of Aerial Bombardment in the 1991 Gulf War, 97 AJIL 481 (2003).
sAmong them, in the present context we might invite particular attention to Ruth Wedgwood, The Enforcement
of Security Council Resolution 687: The Threat of Force Against Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, 92 AJIL 724 (1998);
Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires and the
Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AJIL 124 (1999); and W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97
AJIL 82 (2003).
'On developments especially relevant to the legal analysis of the recent conflict, see Sean D. Murphy, Contem-
porary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 96 AJIL 956-62 (2002), 97 AJIL 203-05 (2003),
97 AJIL 419-32 (2003), and 97 AJIL 681-83 (2003) (infra, this issue).
"0 See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2004).
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The Agora begins with a paper by William Howard Taft !Vand Todd Buchwald, respectively
the Legal Adviser and the Assistant Legal Adviser for Political-Military Affairs of the U.S. Depart-
ment of State. In the fullest statement yet to be published of the U.S. government's legal
position, Taft and Buchwaldjustify the 2003 military action in Iraq as a continuation of law-
ful collective self-defense stemming from Iraq's 1990 attack on Kuwait and Iraq's persistent
material breaches of the cease-fire terms established in April 1991. They maintain that renewed
military action by coalition forces wasjustified pursuant to compulsory Security Council reso-
lutions adopted between 1990 and 2003. Finally, emphasizing that contextual factors are
relevant to the appraisal of any use of force, they consider the resumption of the Iraq war
in 2003 in relation to the Bush administration's preemption doctrine; they conclude that
preemptive action against Iraq is lawful as one episode in a conflict initiated by Iraq and in the
context of Iraq's ongoing defiance of Security Council resolutions.
John Yoo, a former deputy assistant attorney general in the U.S. Department of Justice,
further develops the position that use of force against Iraq in 2003 was authorized under a long
series of Security Council resolutions, including Resolutions 678 (1990), 687 (1991), and 1441
(2002), and that Iraq's material breach of the 1991 cease-fire resolution allowed the United
States to resume hostilities. He also analyzes the military action in terms of the law of antic-
ipatory self-defense as understood beginning with Secretary of State Daniel Webster's for-
mulation in the Caroline dispute with Great Britain (1837) and continuing into the UN Charter
era. Yoo concludes with an assessment of the need for self-defense doctrine to respond to
twenty-first century threats of weapons of mass destruction, rogue states, and terrorism.
Ruth Wedgwood reflects on the need for a system of UN Charter law that can adapt to evolv-
ing security challenges, and on the relationship between substantive legitimacy of forcible
action and the procedural framework for authorizing military enforcement. In the Iraq con-
flict, as with several other situations of the 1990s, the UN Security Council failed to back up
its substantive demands with adequate institutional capacity and stopped short of formally
approving military enforcement of its compulsory measures. In Wedgwood's view, the Charter
should be understood to allow states not only to supply the enforcement capability that the
Council itself lacks, but also to act proactively in the face of dire threats that state or nonstate
actors could use weapons of mass destruction against civilian targets.
With the first three contributions having laid out legal arguments supportive of the 2003
military action in Iraq and considerations relevant to the Bush administration's preemption
doctrine, we next turn to viewpoints elsewhere on the spectrum of opinion. Some of the con-
tributors in the next group accept aspects of the U.S. government's position, but most are
skeptical about the doctrine of preemptive uses of force, or of the legal case for the 2003 inva-
sion, or both. They present a diversity of perspectives on what the Iraq crisis suggests for the
future of the UN Charter system and general international law on the use of force.
Richard N. Gardnerbrings to the Agora the insights of a member of the Kennedy administra-
tion who participated in discussions in October 1962 about the legal aspects of the Cuban
missile crisis, when a conscious choice was made not to embrace an expansive concept of pre-
emptive self-defense. In Gardner's view, the reasons to avoid enlarging self-defense to include
preemption arejust as valid today. The Bush administration did not need the preemption
rationale for the Iraq war in any event, since there was an. entirely sufficientjustification in
previous Security Council resolutions and the repeated findings of "material breach" of Reso-
lution 687. Gardner concludes his essay with an indication of the kinds of uses of force that
should be considered permissible under the law of the UN Charter today, going beyond classic
self-defense against armed attack or Security Council authorization. These would include uses
of force to destroy terrorist groups when the state in which they operate is unable to suppress
them, to prevent a UN member from transferring weapons of mass destruction to terrorist
groups, to rescue endangered nationals, and to act under the auspices of the United Nations
or a regional organization to prevent genocide or other massive atrocities.
20031
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RichardA. Falk contrasts the 2003 Iraq war to the 1999 Kosovo intervention, which the Inde-
pendent International Commission on Kosovo (on which Falk served) characterized as "ille-
gal, but legitimate." The Kosovo Commission found substantive legitimacy in a military inter-
vention that went forward without the formal approval of the UN Security Council, but it also
articulated exacting conditions that ought to be satisfied in the absence of such approval,
including the imminence of grave harm and the lack of nonforcible means to protect against
such harm. In the Iraq case, these material conditions for legitimacy were not met at the time
that the intervention was mounted, because there was neither imminence nor necessity; and
the intervention could not be justified even if the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime
produced good consequences for the Iraqi people or the region. Falk concludes that pre-
ventive war is not acceptable and that the United States should return to the Charter system
in its own long-range interests.
Miriam Sapiro directs her attention to the Bush administration's preemption doctrine, which
she views as a significant departure from previous conceptions of anticipatory self-defense
as understood either in the Caroline formulation or in the UN Charter framework. She per-
ceives substantial dangers in the Bush doctrine (which could more accurately be described as
"preventive" rather than preemptive self-defense), since the relaxation of the constraints of
imminence, necessity, and a high level of certainty of impending harm could be destabiliz-
ing and potentially catastrophic. She recommends dealing cooperatively and multilaterally
with threats of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism and urges a quiet retrenchment
from the expansive readings of the National Security Strategy.
The next two pieces in the Agora begin from the premise that the invasion of Iraq in 2003
was a major departure from the norms of the UN Charter. They invite reflection on whether
these developments sound the death knell for Article 2 (4)'s prohibition on the use of force
or whether the Charter system is sufficiently resilient for constructive adaptation.
Thomas M. Franck asked Who Killed Article 2(4)? in his 1970 article published in these pages,
and revisits the same question with even greater poignancy. The major difference between
the Charter violations lamented at that time and Franck's assessment of the conduct of the
key actors in 2003 is that today even the fig-leaf of legal justification within the Charter
framework seems to have been discarded. He finds little plausibility in the U.S. and British
arguments that the invasion of Iraq was authorized by previous Security Council resolutions
or by Iraq's "material breach." Franck dismisses the possibility that an unvarnished violation
of Charter norms might carry the potential for reforming the law of the Charter in salutary
directions, in view of the apparent desire of the present U.S. administration to disable the
United Nations and shrug off any remaining Charter-based constraints. He ends with an ex-
hortation to international lawyers to remain true to the rule of law.
Tom Farer takes the invasion of Iraq as illustrative of a fundamental jurisprudential prob-
lem, namely the effect of law-breaking behavior on the viability of the norms at issue. Much
will depend on the reaction to the law-violation: will scholars and politicians continue to insist
on the normative quality of the Charter prohibitions, or will they abandon any pretense that
the Charter can serve as a meaningful constraint? Farer contrasts the Iraq situation in 2003
with Charter violations in the Cold War period and with the 1999 NATO intervention in
Kosovo: he believes the latter had contextual features capable of limiting its potential for over-
turning the Charter system. The Iraq invasion carries more ominous implications, but the
U.S. government could confine them by restraining some of its unilateralist impulses. At the
present time, the prognosis for the Charter system is unclear.
The concluding piece in the Agora responds to the alarm raised in the previous two con-
tributions that the core Charter norm of nonuse of force might be dead or at least mortally
wounded.Jane Stromseth discerns in the Iraq crisis the possibility for genuine renewal of the
" Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 AJIL 809 (1970).
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Charter's norms and reform of its systemic features. A first reason that she finds it prema-
ture to pronounce the death of Charter law is that the legal case for the use of force against
Iraq is much closer than the critics acknowledge: in Resolution 1441, Security Council mem-
bers left open the possibility of military action without a subsequent authorizing resolution,
or at least agreed to disagree on this point. Second, the core of the Charter remains viable,
because all states and their informed publics continue to place a heavy burden ofjustifica-
tion in terms of the Charter on those who use or propose to use force. Third, the Charter sys-
tem is flexible enough to evolve to meet changing conditions. Stromseth then turns to con-
crete proposals for addressing the daunting challenges of the present and future, including
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. In place of the Bush administration's open-ended
preemption doctrine, Stromseth recommends intensified efforts to enlist collective support
for U.S. initiatives, in the first instance through regionalself-defense organizations. She also
makes specific proposals for revitalizing the Security Council to improve its capabilities to
meet threats to peace and security.
We encourage our readers to carry on this debate in classrooms of international law, in
the press, in their communities, and in communications with their elected representatives
and other public officials.
LORI FISLER DAMROSCH AND BERNARD H. OXMAN"
PREEMPTION, IRAQ, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Preemption comes in many forms and what we think of it depends on the circumstances.
One state may not strike another merely because the second might someday develop an
ability and desire to attack it. Yet few would criticize a strike in the midst of an ongoing war
against a second state's program to develop new types of weapons. Between these two exam-
ples lie countless fact patterns.
In the end, each use of force must find legitimacy in the facts and circumstances that the
state believes have made it necessary. Each should bejudged not on abstract concepts, but
on the particular events that gave rise to it. While nations must not use preemption as a pre-
text for aggression, to be for or against preemption in the abstract is a mistake. The use of
force preemptively is sometimes lawful and sometimes not.'
Operation Iraqi Freedom has been criticized as unlawful because it constitutes preemption.
This criticism is unfounded. Operation Iraqi Freedom was and is lawful. An otherwise lawful use
of force does not become unlawful because it can be characterized as preemption. Operation
Iraqi Freedom was conducted in a specific context that frames the way it should be analyzed.
This context included the naked aggression by Iraq against its neighbors, its efforts to obtain
* Editors in Chief.
'The legal basis for the doctrine of preemption is set out in President Bush's National Security Strategy
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully
take action to, defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars
and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the evidence of an imminent
threat-most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.
THE NATIONAL SEcURrIY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (Sept. 17, 2002), available at <http://www.
whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>. The notion of preemption is inherent in the right ofself-defense, recognizing the need
to adapt the concept of imminence to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. The use of force preemp-
tively in self-defense is the right of each state and does not require Security Council action. In calculating whether
the test of imminence has been met, it would be irresponsible to ignore that these adversaries "rely on acts of terror
and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction-weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and
used without warning" Id. (emphasis added). In the case of Iraq, President Bush made clear that the United States
could always proceed in the exercise of its inherent right of self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter. See Report in Connection with Presidential Determination Under Public Law 107-243, reprinted in 149
CONG. REc. H1957, H1958 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2003) (on resolution authorizing use of force against Iraq).
2003]
